member of the political bureau of the Islamist party al-Nahdha told me in the summer of 2011: "This was not an Islamic revolution. It was a nationalist and popular revolution (thawra wataniyya wa sha'biyya). Of course it was not devoid of questions related to identity. But it was a secular revolution (thawra 'ilmaniyya) that did not take place against Islam. They also wanted to impose limits on what they considered to be non-Islamic behaviors. Those who referred to the idea of a Tunisia they wanted to be "secular" or "modern," demanded the liberation of expression in almost all its forms, but often wanted to impose limits on some expressions of Islam they deemed dangerous or incorrect. For both sides, the content and limits of the newly acquired freedom needed to be defined. New battle lines were drawn that had less to do with the pitting of the pro "Islamic state" camp versus the pro "democratic-secular state"
forces-as they were often described by the actors themselves-than with different conceptions of freedom (hurriyya) and of its content and limits. It is worth noting that, unlike the secular versus Islamic state debate, freedom was a concept conspicuously present in the 2010-2011 protests, for instance in the slogan "Work, freedom, national dignity" (shughl, hurriyya, karama wataniyya).
What did freedom mean for Tunisians after the departure of Ben Ali? Should it be allowed to say and do anything? In other words what are the limits to one's exercise of freedom and how are these limits defined? I argue that these questions on the meaning of freedom that proliferated in the public arena in combination with those on Islam and secularism, were less about the form of the political regime-there was a consensus among Tunisians that it should be a republican electoral democracy-than about the "ways of life" of Tunisians. The Tunisian political transition can help examine how conceptions of "ways of life," that is, the understanding of correct beliefs and conduct, translate into and shape politics. Political ideologies neither made themselves visible in the uprisings, nor emerged as important forces shaping the dynamics of the transition. "This revolution was mute, it did not articulate an ideological project," 9 a Tunisian professor of philosophy commented to me in June 2011. This diagnosis was echoed by a secondary school teacher who interpreted the uprisings as "a revolution of bodies, not minds." 10 "The youth have projects, but they are personal projects," a member of the Maghrebi Liberal Party also told me. 11 I contend that this is the case because after January 14, 2011, rather than fight for specific ideological systems and for these ideologies' specific understandings of the state, Tunisian political elites cared, debated, and fought about safeguarding their individual ways of life and about the attendant conception of freedom they imagined.
In order to delve into the new politics of post-Ben Ali Tunisia, a politics devoid of ideological projects but animated by convictions about how one ought to live, I start this essay with an explanation of the nature of the Tunisian protests. An uprising stemming from an economic crisis and deep regional economic inequalities at first, it rapidly became political, leading to the fall of the President of the Republic and to the expansion of freedom of expression.
In spite of the prevailing dire economic problems, the public political discussions during the transition period that followed focused on the meaning of "Islamism" and "secularism," as they related to definitions of ways of life. I examine these discussions by focusing mainly on the Islamist party al-Nahdha and its conceptions of "secularism." I show that like most other parties, it supported the idea of an electoral democracy combined with a religious establishment.
Although the project of electoral democracy was one that contrasted with the practices of the previous regime, the notion of a religious establishment molded itself into its institutions. I argue that Islamist and secularist intellectuals and activists, taking advantage of the new freedoms of expression, competed on their different conceptions of ways of life, whereas a status quo was maintained on an institutional relationship between state and religion that enabled the formulation of limits to freedoms. I end this essay by showing how the notion of "public order"
was invoked in several legal affairs in post-Ben Ali Tunisia to outline the content and limits of individual freedoms, in continuity with the previous authoritarian regime. The fear of chaos spurred by religious confrontations brought back the state into being the institution maintaining order, an order called for by Islamists and secularists alike to put limits to the new freedoms and safeguard each camp's ways of life.
From Economics to Politics: The Collapse of Two Myths
The Collapse of the Myth of the Tunisian "Economic Miracle"
The uprisings that started in late 2010 in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, opened up a new political era. In post-colonial Tunisia, and more largely in post-colonial North Africa, popular protests were not a new phenomenon. Dubbed the "bread revolts," they had punctuated social and economic life since the 1960s, but had never led to regime change. 12 In 2011, however, a strong and massive popular mobilization succeeded in beheading the state and opened up a transitional period that led to free elections for a Constituent Assembly and a new interim government. In Tunisia, as in Egypt and Libya, the success of these protests in toppling the heads of the regimes indicated that any type of negotiated or "pacted" transition had failed and that it took the force of popular mobilization in the streets to produce political change: these regimes were not able, contrary to what many observers and analysts were expecting, to reform from within. 13 The traditional political opposition itself was not at the origin of these uprisings. The popular protests were not led by the traditional legal and illegal opposition groups, who were in fact surprised by the course of these extraordinary events. In addition, not only did political change originate from outside the regime itself and from outside the sphere of the traditional opposition: it originated from outside the political field tout court. It was the economic crisis that precipitated the Tunisian protests. As if politics could not take care of itself, the economic crisis became the force behind political change. In the decade that ended in 2008, the Tunisian economy grew at an annual rate of about 5%, leading international observers as well as the regime itself to speak of a "Tunisian economic miracle." 14 But after the financial crisis of 2008, with the contraction of the global economy, especially in Europe, which is the main export market for Tunisia, growth weakened. This made the economic situation fragile. Between 2007 and 2010, Tunisia's GDP annual growth rate decreased from 6.3% to 3.7%. 15 During the same period, indicators of well being also decreased, 16 leading an increasing number of young Tunisians to attempt to migrate legally or illegally to Europe. 17 In 2008, unemployment rates reached 13% on average but were 30% for the youth (15-24 years). 18 In the 1990s, the World Bank had hailed Tunisian economic reforms as successful but had neglected the significance of growing inequalities. The nature of the [2010] [2011] protests were what made the World Bank recognize the necessity of taking into account social exclusion and economic inequalities in its evaluations. 19 In the center regions of Tunisia, such as Kasserine and Sidi Bouzid, the cradle of the 2010-2011 uprisings, increasing inequalities and social exclusion were at the source of the uprisings. 20 After the departure of Ben
Ali, the myth of the "economic miracle," which had been cultivated by the regime, fell apart.
An Uprising against Social Exclusion Turned Political
This is not to say that the uprisings had no political significance. In Tunisia, week after week, as new towns and cities joined in the protests, progressively reaching Tunis, the capital, the demonstrations became endowed with clear political meaning. They carried a strong moral condemnation of the regime. Indeed, the self-immolation of Bouazizi, 21 rather than being interpreted as another sign of the suffering of the disinherited youth, was recounted by political activists as a political assassination: the state was the real culprit of Bouazizi's death because it had failed to respond to his requests for help. 22 The absence of ideological slogans inspired by the intellectual traditions of the opposition was striking. Shughl, hurriyya, karama wataniyya (Work, freedom, national dignity) was one of the most repeated slogans early in the protests. The notion of dignity (karama) was central in the narratives of the protests, which denounced the economic and political humiliation that Tunisians experienced daily under the authoritarian regime. National dignity was understood to proceed from the first two items evoked in the slogan: work and freedom. Unlike during the nationalist struggle against French occupation, national dignity was not to proceed from gaining independence from the foreigner. This time, the collective sense of belonging to one's nation would proceed from individual rights of access to economic opportunities. The people's demands were focused on their material conditions of life.
However, these demands also expressed a desire for a new type of relationship between
Tunisians and their state. The demand for economic access was deeply linked to a demand for access to citizenship. Tunisians wanted to be recognized as citizens instead of being treated as subjects. A few days before January 14, 2011 the blend of economic and political demands gave way to a new slogan: "The people want to topple the regime" (al-sha'b yurid isqat al-nizam).
From its economic and moral origins, the movement became clearly political. In the Tunisian and international media, the uprisings were interpreted as a "secular revolution," whose actors This second phase led to the legalization of political parties: more than 100 of them competed for the electors' votes. This marked a strong break with the previous 55 years of post-colonial politics in Tunisia, during which no election was held in a fair and free context and the opposition was either co-opted and considerably weakened or brutally repressed. Among these political parties stood those that had traditionally shaped the Tunisian political landscape: from the old communist party to the center left political groups and the Islamist movement al-Nahdha.
In this newly opened political game, al-Nahdha's popularity and deeply shattered the Tunisian political landscape, from which it had been excluded since the creation of its movement in 1981. As had happened with the image of an economically successful Tunisia, the myth of a "secular" and "modern" Tunisia fell apart.
It was striking that in spite of the daunting economic problems that Tunisia was facing at the time, the public debates during and after the electoral campaign did not focus mainly on economic policy or social questions, but rather on the future role of the Islamist party and on the place of religion in politics. Although it was often repeated during and in the immediate aftermath of Ben Ali's fall that the Tunisian uprisings were not founded on religious demands and would not lead to an "Islamic revolution," 23 Islam and its place in society and politics haunted the public discussions. This "discursive explosion," 24 to borrow a phrase from Michel Foucault, merits an examination. Indeed, it seemed that Islam as a political concept was simultaneously repressed by a desire to marginalize its political significance and persistently brought up as an object of public interest 25 .
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To understand this paradox, it is necessary to examine the history of the Tunisian Islamist movement's ideas and political behavior, since its ideology and strategic intentions were at the center of the debates animating Tunisian transitional politics.
The Tunisian Islamist Movement, Modernity, and Secularism
The Tunisian Islamist movement started to take shape at the end of the 1960s, first as an apolitical trend influenced by the Pakistani Jama'at al-Tabligh, which was active in Tunisia at that time. In the beginning, the movement only focused on seeking to bring Tunisians back to Islamic practices and morals, and was not interested in politics. In the mid 1970s, however, the Al-Nahdha's Political Thought and the Question of Democracy How can we define or summarize the political thought at the foundation of the ideology of the alNahdha party? It is simply impossible to respond to this question because its ideology is not based on a systematic theoretical edifice about politics or about the state more particularly. In other words, al-Nahdha's ideology is not based on a systematic and coherent theory that can be reconstructed through the reading of its founder, Rached Ghannouchi. It is not possible to outline with precision the polity that Ghannouchi imagines. His writings are not meant to provide a political theory, but are rather responses to questions raised by contextual politics. This is in particular true for its stance on the question of democracy and for its definition-or lack thereofof the Islamic state. In the past, al-Nahdha's official ideology did not openly and publicly espouse arguments in favor of the use of violence, although the movement was thought to be associated with violent attacks in Tunisia. 26 The founding document of the Tunisian Islamist movement included democracy as a recognized principle. Early in the 1980s, Rached
Ghannouchi wrote that democracy was a necessity for Tunisian political life, but did not develop a reflection on the relation between democracy and Islam or if and how an Islamic state could be democratic. 27 Among Al-Nahdha's leaders, some might also have envisioned the possibility of operating in a non-democratic context in which they might have shared power within the incumbent regime. As for Ghannouchi, in the mid 1980s, the efforts of the Islamist movements had to be focused on survival rather than on theoretical and programmatic thoughts. 28 However, while in exile in London after 1989, Ghannouchi had the opportunity to elaborate further on the question of democracy and Islam, and to insist on his commitment to democracy. 29 The 2011 political transition gave al-Nahdha the opportunity to test this commitment and put it into practice, creating a tension between the theoretical combination of Islam and democracy and the practice of democracy.
This shift towards more attention to democracy by al-Nahdha was not unique in the When I was in France, I did not care about democracy. I was part of a socialist trend. I had even gone to China… I was deeply indifferent to the question of democracy. I considered it a cultural oddity. It was only when I eventually went back to Tunisia that I started thinking about that question." 30 The evolution of the al-Nahdha movement towards a commitment to democracy is therefore not unique, but rather a feature of most political opposition groups since the end of the 1970s in Tunisia.
In the 2000s, al-Nahdha also decided on a political rapprochement with non-Islamist opposition parties and groups that were now committed to democracy and were also repressed by the regime. Part of the Tunisian left and the Islamists of al-Nahdha rallied together to demand more freedoms from Ben Ali's regime, forming the October 18, 2005 movement in favor of what they called "a minimum wage of democracy." 31 In interaction with other groups, the Islamist movement's leaders insisted on democratic commitment. 32 Al-Nahdha's more recent narratives, as they emerge from the writings and pronouncements of its leaders in the decade that preceded the 2010-11 uprisings, 33 indicate a deep engagement of the Tunisian Islamist project with the concepts at the heart of liberal democracy. This combination of democracy and Islam was based on the adherence to the principles of electoral democracy on the one hand and on Islamic law being understood as the result of democratic legislation rather than originating from divine commands on the other hand. 34 Al-Nahdha's emphasis on democracy was also accompanied by a desire to keep established religion at the heart of the polity, in continuity with the regimes of Bourguiba and Ben Ali. This allowed the movement to speak of the state as a "civil state" (dawla "Tunisia is a free and sovereign state, its language is Arabic, its religion is Islam, and its regime is the Republic." What was to become of this article in the new constitution drafting process?
Intense debates about its meaning showed that Tunisians gave it different interpretations ranging from the definition of the people's identity, to the principles of sharia being at the foundation of the state. However, during the electoral campaign and even more so after the elections of October 23, 2011, it was rare to find a political party that was ready to raise objections against the inclusion of this article in the future constitution. This was because its absence would produce heated disagreements whereas its presence could satisfy all types of interpretations, since it could be read in different ways. Article 1 could be accepted by all precisely because it had different meanings for different constituencies, without these differences being explicit in its formulation. When asked about Article 1 in the summer of 2011, a former minister in Bourguiba's regime told me, "it is entirely legitimate to write that the state's religion is Islam in the Constitution. It does not matter, because it does not mean anything. You can also add that the state has two feet and two hands, it does not make a difference." 35 In his view, this was a symbolic formulation made to appease the partisans of the Islamic identity of Tunisia. Those who invoked a secular Tunisia were ready to accept this formulation as the line beyond which they would not go. "We thought we should work on a minimum consensus and defend modern Tunisia, unite on the values of human rights and liberty of conscience. It is true that we also said that we agree to keep article one of the constitution as the maximum acceptable. We are ourselves talking about the religion of Tunisia, and not about the religion of the state, but this ambiguity was intentional on Bourguiba's part," a representative of the Pôle Démocratique
Moderniste (al-Qutb al-dimuqrati al-hadathi), the left coalition of parties most in agreement with the values of secularism, told me. 36 When I asked a member of the political bureau of alNahdha about the meaning of Article 1, he also responded that it was a matter of identity, no less no more, and refused to elaborate further on the meaning of a "state's religion" except for saying that the state should not "control" religion but rather "organize it." 37 Rached Ghannouchi, Secularism, and Religious Establishment:
In his books and articles, Rached Ghannouchi, the Islamist party al-Nahdha's leader and main ideologue, engages with the question of the state and its relation with Islam. In particular, he often associates secularism ('ilmaniyya) with authoritarianism and modernity (hadatha). In an article published in 2011, he criticized the "secularist project" and defined it as "the marginalization of religion and its estrangement from the struggles of life." 38 In his view, the task of the Islamist movement is to "reestablish the relationship between religion and life and the leadership of religion over life." 39 For Ghannouchi, "modernization," the hallmark of the secularists, is not acceptable within a secular environment, but only in an Islamic framework, since the Islamist project embraces all aspects of life. 40 Therefore, in his view, Islam, in order to avoid losing its own integrity, has to "penetrate" (ikhtiraq) modernity rather than the other way around. 41 His critique of secularism is not unique to the Islamist project. It is common among liberal Western intellectuals and activists who advocate religious participation in public life in their own countries while at the same time rejecting the presence of religion in the state. 42 However, Ghannouchi's project is not that of a liberal critique of secularism. Ghannouchi does not envision, in a future Tunisian democracy, a separation of religion and state: in the very words of Article 1 of the 1959 Constitution, Islam is for him and for his movement "the religion of the state." The Islamist movement argues for religious establishment and democracy, a combination that has perhaps gained more appeal for the movement with Ghannouchi's long exile in Great Britain.
Therefore, for al-Nahdha, the liberation of Islam from the control of the state does not mean the separation of state and religion, or even neutrality of the state towards religion. The state that Ghannouchi envisions is a civil and democratic state, but it also needs to engage with religion in specific ways: to organize it, but also, to implement it. Ghannouchi's liberation of
Islam from the state does not imply a rupture between them. Rather, the state is put at the service of religion, and it is up to those democratically elected to govern and define the ways in which this "service" operates. It is striking that Ghannouchi does not talk of "sharia implementation"
(tatbiq al-shari'a, a phrase widely used by other Islamist movements), but rather of "Islamic implementation" (tatbiq islami), a concept on which he does not elaborate. 43 In addition, the relationship between state and religion remains ambivalent in the thought of al-Nahdha's activists. On the one hand, they clearly articulate a desire to liberate religion from state domination: the first issues of their weekly journal al-Fajr contained several articles demanding "the liberation of the mosques." 44 On the other hand, they also insist that the state must organize (tanzim) religion without controlling it. institutions, and an independent justice system. Legitimacy comes from the ballot box. We demand political alternation, the respect of minorities' rights, and the defense of the principle of tolerance of the other. When we talk about a civil state, we do not mean a theocratic state. We want separation and balance between powers…And a press that is independent...We agree on the broad principles, on the basic principles that Islamists, liberals, secularists believe in: individual liberties, equality between all citizens. Are these principles the essence of secularism? No, these
are the values of all children of Tunisia. Islam can work within these values. In addition, we have to revive the mosques, and the mosque pulpits, which must not be a space for political struggle, but for worship: they do not belong to political parties." Tunisians are good believers who do not like constraints." 54 It is striking that both Ajmi Lourimi and Yadh Ben Achour defined the secularist and the Islamist projects as exclusively focused on ways of life respectively related to irreconcilable bodily practices.
Thinking about Labels
Can these labels of "Islamism" and "secularism" help us describe the political landscape of postBen Ali Tunisia? The previous regimes instrumentalized them in order to divide and weaken the opposition, which compels us to use them carefully. However, these labels and the ways in Islamists and the Secularists." 56 He developed an analysis of secularism and secularists that implicitly reappropriated the tropes usually used in academic and political writings on Islamism.
For him, it was a mistake to think that the Tunisian protests had nothing to do with the question of secularism. It was, he argued, "a political problem" that divided the political landscape in two camps, and even two classes (tabaqatayn). He continued that there were two sorts of secularism:
the first, which he accepted, separated the state and the religious institution 57 ; the second was "radical" and sought to eliminate religion from the public space and from life altogether. For
Bu'anani radical secularism could only produce dictatorship. Having in mind the regime of Ben Ali, he also associated radical forms of secularism with the models of radical secularism of Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and France. For him, these cases exemplified radical secularism ('ilmaniyya mutatarrifa) because their secularism was "comprehensive" (shamila); radical secularism "separates religion from the life of the Muslim. We refuse secularism as a philosophy and an order (nizam) for life. We think that this type of secularism contradicts the intentions of our noble Islamic religion." 58 The article operated as the mirror image of a series of arguments In addition to the description of the ideas behind Islamism and secularism by each camp, an imagined sociology of one another's constituencies also circulated. As early as Spring 2011, the ideological polarization between the "Islamist" and the "secularist" camps was playing out in a public debate, and the "Islamist" and "secularist" categories were endowed with a significant political role. The two "camps" built up a representation of each other through a mirror effect that distorted a complex reality by stereotyping it. However, the stereotypes themselves are not to be dismissed, They have a significant impact on the political arena. Indeed, they help describe In fact, none of the main secular or Islamist parties (CPR, Ettakatol, and al-Nahdha) won in Sidi
Bouzid and Kasserine, two regions where social exclusion and poverty were the highest. A populist list, al-'aridha al-sha'biyya, obtained 35.06% of the votes versus 1.55% for CPR, 0.97% for Ettakatol, and 14.30% for al-Nahdha. 61 This seems to indicate that the secularist parties' and al-Nahdha's constituencies are not necessarily that different in terms of their socioeconomic characteristics. What seems to differentiate them more clearly is their understanding of cultural mores and identity politics, making al-Nahdha and secular parties defend two contrasting ways of life.
Ways of Life as Limits to Freedoms
Under the regimes of Bourguiba and Ben Ali, the state officialized the "modern" way of life:
"feminist" and "westernized," as well as "authentically Tunisian." The authoritarian regime stigmatized and repressed the "Islamist" way of life. After the 2011 protests, these two camps confronted each other, using the tropes of the imagined sociology I described earlier. Sometimes they also initiated a dialogue in public forums. They were both free of the previous forms of direct and repressive censorship by the state, but were still constrained by these representations.
They both came in defense of freedom, against the authoritarianism of the post-colonial regime, but they also both thought they needed to set limits to these freedoms in order to protect their ways of life in the new political competition that had opened up. The emergence of controversies helped shape these positions about limits to freedom. For instance, for the secularists, unlimited freedoms given to the Islamists were threatening "modernity," as happened when female students requested to be allowed in the university campus of La Mannouba University wearing a face veil at the end of the year 2011. For the Islamists, unlimited freedom of expression given to the "modernists" in the media was problematic. As an illustration of this tension, I will now examine a controversy that shows how the question of freedom of expression was being legally formulated in the period of political transition, and how some Islamists -who did not necessarily belong to al-Nahdha-referred to the notion of nizam 'amm or "public order" to confront their political adversaries in continuity with the legal narratives of the authoritarian regime.
From Iran to Tunisia: the Persepolis Controversy in Court
The Broadcast of Persepolis and the Public Order Argument On October 7, 2011, the Maghrebi private television channel Nessma broadcast the movie Persepolis by Iranian film director Marjane Satrapi. The movie was dubbed in Tunisian dialect, in order to reach the largest possible audience. It was followed by a televised debate between four Tunisian intellectuals who discussed the movie in relation to the events taking place in Tunisia at that time. The debate was cast in the following terms: "will Tunisia be the next Iran?"
Persepolis was the perfect setting for this debate, since it presented a critical view of the period International news media announced afterwards that around "300 Salafis" had attempted to storm the offices of the television station and to attack its director, condemning scenes involving sex and alcohol in the movie, as well as a scene in which God is represented in human form.
Contradictory reports subsequently claimed that the number of 300 protesters had been inflated and that the crowd did not consist of "Salafi" protestors exclusively. Doubt was also cast on the identity and the motives of the protestors and it was alleged that they might have been sent by those who wanted to derail the election scheduled for October 23, 2011.
Public Order and the Limits to Freedoms
More importantly for my purpose, the controversy took a legal turn transferring the political contentions that had taken place in the streets and on the social networks to the sphere of litigation: a collective of 144 lawyers acted as the plaintiff against the TV station CEO, Nabil
Karoui. This collective claimed that Karoui had offended the "sacred values of Islam," as well as "decency." 62 Karoui defended his actions by saying that the movie had been shown in theaters earlier in Tunis and that it had passed the scrutiny of the offices of state censorship. It was retorted to him that to show a movie in theaters had a lesser impact than to broadcast it on television.Movie theaters only gave access to the film to a small audience, but television made it enter into all Tunisian homes. The lawyers' collective based its complaint on two legal texts: the Press Code of 1975, a law that had been passed under President Bourguiba who had been appointed "President for Life" a year earlier. 63 They referred to Articles 42 and 48 in particular.
Article 42 states that "the accomplices of a crime or a misdemeanor will be punished if through the press or any other intentional mode of dissemination, they will have directly provoked The same exception is used in Tunisian international private law. 67 When the discrepancy between two legal regimes is too important, the private law from the other state does not apply, because the foreign norm "harms" public order. As analyzed by Bodin, "International public order defines the limits of tolerance of our juridical system vis-à-vis foreign institutions." 68 However, in French law, the notion of public order is not restricted to International private law.
In administrative law, itself a branch of public law, the notion of public order means "public security" (sécurité publique), that is "security, tranquility, salubrity, or public morality." 69 After the artists refused to let the bailif in, the exhibit was attacked by Salafists who destroyed some of the art works. The self-proclaimed imam of the Zaytuna Mosque, Houcine Laabidi, called for the artists' murder. On August 17, two artists who were part of the exhibit were brought to justice by the tribunal of first instance of Tunis for "disturbing public order and offending decency." The affair mobilized civil society groups in defense of the artists, leading to the minister of culture-Mehdi Mabrouk, an independent-changing his mind about the merits of the exhibit. He had declared at first that it was mediocre and did not warrant to be defended, but eventually concluded that it had to be defended in the name of freedom of expression.
In all these affairs, which seriously compromise a freedom of expression only gained after the 2010-11 protests, the Troika government and al-Nahdha in particular have taken ambivalent positions, or have avoided taking a clear one, creating tensions within the governing coalition and beyond. Al-Nahdha seems to be drawn by its right wing and the Salafi constituencies into an uncompromising position to defend "sacred values" at the expense of freedom of expression. In addition, some of its members have also drawn the public debate toward conservative understandings of social mores and limits to freedom of expression in two legislative proposals presented to the Constituent Assembly. On August 1, 2012, the Committee for Rights and Liberties in the Assembly voted a constitutional article defining the "principle of
[the] complementarity of women and men within the family," which was defended by al-Nahdha female member and vice president of the Assembly Maherzia Laabidi. However, after two months of intense debates outside of the Assembly, the committee dropped the article. Samir Dilou, member of the Troika and of the al-Nahdha party, declared on September 21, 2012 that the notion of complementarity "had no meaning." 73 In the same vein, as a response to the Abdelliya controversy, on August 1 st , 2012, the al-Nahdha group in the Constituent Assembly presented a draft law to amend the penal code so that that it would criminalize offenses against "sacred values" and "symbols." The project was eventually withdrawn after the strong opposition of civil society groups.
These affairs show that the two principles of Islam's protection and freedom of expression are now being pitted against each other, giving shape to cultural wars that will frame the politics of Tunisia for a long time. They are replacing the old debate between the "secular state" and the "Islamic state," and seem to thrive in the framework of the institutions of the old regime. Although al-Nahdha attempted to modify the law to provide more protection to Islamic values and a more Islamic veneer to the notion of "public order," the current laws already provide such a protection and are being used effectively to stifle freedom of expression. AlNahdha is not the only actor to use these laws. Salafis, as well as Islamist lawyers, have used them as political devices, and other constituencies in the future will surely use the public order exception to shape the public space in the way they see fit. A party such as Nida Tunis, which was formed in the summer of 2012 to counter al-Nahdha on a modernist platform, might also use the same exception if it comes to power. While these affairs follow one another and competing representations of ways of life overwhelm the public debates in Tunisia, and while political forces actively prepare for future elections, little attention is given to economic reform and to the foundations of the democratic state. For these reasons, the authoritarian state founded by Bourguiba and reappropriated by Ben Ali might very well endure under a democratically elected government.
I want to thank Benoît Challand, Tamir Moustafa, Kristen Stilt, Lucette Valensi, and two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this paper, as well as Youssef Ben Ismail for his research assistance. 1 The period of mass protests that started on December 17, 2010-the day of the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi-and ended on January 14, 2011-the departure of President Ben Ali from the country-was called a thawra by Tunisians, which can be translated by "uprising," "revolt," or "revolution." In its current usage, the word thawra often refers to revolutions of modern times such as the French revolution of 1789 or the revolt of Tunisians against the Bey's taxation policies in 1864. However, as I write these lines, it is too early to say if a revolution in the sense of a profound transformation of the state and of the socio-economic structures will take place as a consequence of the protests of [2010] [2011] 
